Well, to a certain extent this (the application for NATO membership) is a predictable outcome of Russia's aggression against another non-aligned state (Ukraine). Although the Swedish and Russian Empires once warred against each other for decades and Finland once served as a Russian buffer state, the two northwestern European nations moved to non-aligned status for generations, the Swedes from the early 1800's and Finland from its independence in the early 1900's.
It's clear what NATO would gain from the prospective enrollment: a dominating foothold in the Baltic Sea, and a key waterway for Russian trade. True, Russia already has a commanding military presence in the region, but clearly this change in the status quo is perceived as a challenge, a risk to their military and trade security.
So why would I oppose the expansion of NATO, if not our continued involvement with NATO? Am I, as in McCain's infamous rant against Rand Paul, "working for Putin", a childish taunt repeated in various forms by thousands of Twitter leftist trolls with Russia Derangement Syndrome? No.
Our forefathers warned against foreign entanglements; George Washington in his farewell address, discussed this:
Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent Alliances, with any portion of the foreign world—So far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it—for let me not be understood as capable of patronising infidility to existing engagements...But in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.
To make an analogy from the principles of cybersecurity, we want to limit our attack surface NATO membership initially had 12 ember nations, now 30, By the treaty, we are committed to militarily support attacks of other nations, including any provocations by allies. Increased financial and military commitments outweigh any advantage. In fact, Russia may view NATO expansion as a security threat and respond accordingly. To what degree do we add to our obligations at the expense of additional American blood and treasure, when our own debt already has hit, already 30.4T, greater than 20T or so GDP.
Donald Trump had gotten part of this right. He felt a number (most, including Germany) of NATO countries were free-riding off the American taxpayer. But de facto he pursued interventionist engagement, hired neo-con advisers, and signed into law record military spending.
How did JFK respond in the Cuba missile crisis? Is it not hypocritical to disregard perceived threats of militarized northwest European neighbors to Russia?
One of my favorite senators Robert Taft (who died years before I was born) gave a famous speech outlining his principle objections to NATO. He supported a Western European version of the Monroe Doctrine (which, as you recall, wasn't a Western Hemisphere treaty), where the US was committed against existential threats to the Western democracies but didn't commit to a primary military footprint.
He outlined 3 basic objections:
- Taft thought the treaty would enable POTUS to act to even minor infractions without Congressional approval
- He believed that Russia could respond to nearby encirclement and NATO expansion by a preemptive military attack.
- He did not believe we could afford the economic and military expenses of sustaining NATO.
Hr believed that a more comprehensive engagement, including Russia, perhaps in a beefed-up UN, would be a preferred alternative.
Taft wouldn't have been the only one concerned about NATO more than doubling in partners:
George Kennan, perhaps our most famous Cold War diplomat and widely considered to be the father of the United States’ containment strategy, famously opposed NATO expansion in the 1990s, writing in the New York Times that expanding NATO would be a “fateful error” that would “inflame the nationalistic, anti‐Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion” and “restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East‐West relations.” Like Senator Paul, Kennan also worried about the problems of credibility and overextension.
In 1995, a group of almost two dozen retired Foreign Service, State Department, and Department of Defense officers who served during the Cold War signed an open letter opposing NATO expansion on grounds similar to Paul and Kennan. They argued it risked exacerbating instability and “convincing most Russians that the United States and the West are attempting to isolate, encircle, and subordinate them.” The signatories included Paul H. Nitze, former Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense, as well as Jack F. Matlock, Jr., former Ambassador to the USSR, and John A. Armitage, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
Jacob Hornberger, a 2020 LP Presidential candidate who I supported, does a nice job tying these points together. [On an aside, although I've never met Jacob, I met his little brother Charles in high school; he was a stellar debater and a star basketball player on our district undefeated teams.] Jacob points out that the USSR wanted buffer states in eastern Europe after Hitler's heavy-casualty invasion, and the US promised no expansion of NATO beyond the original dozen. But even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, not only NATO, an anachronism, survive after its earlier objections to the occupation of East Europe went away, quickly expanding in Russia's safety zone. The dispute over Crimea in Ukraine has to do with a prized Russian warm water port on the Black Sea there that Russia had won from the Ottoman Empire around the time the US won independence. The USSR transferred Crimea to Ukraine in 1954. I believe Russia had long-standing leases of ports which possibly came into question when a pro-Western revolt in 2014 overthrew a pro-Russian government with ambitions to join the EU and NATO. Note I am not trying to justify Russian aggression but to provide context.
