At least since the 2004 Kerry Presidential campaign, the generic progressive Democratic story has been to allege that the 2003 liberation of Iraq was an unnecessary war and diverted sufficient forces away from Afghanistan, in a zero-sum fashion, to forestall completion of the "real" war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Hence, to be consistent, as forces draw down in Iraq, Obama must redeploy additional troops to Afghanistan to finish the job.
I fundamentally disagree with this rationalization. I am not going to renew a debate of Iraq in this post, but the fact is that Saddam Hussein was a destabilizing influence in the historically volatile Middle East, he had materially violated original Gulf War ceasefire terms and ignored some 17 UN resolutions, we had a preexisting bipartisan policy of regime change, and multiple Western intelligence agencies provided, in hindsight, questionable intelligence for policy makers and legislators. Saddam Hussein had the know-how, materials and/or production capacity for weapons of mass destruction. There was little doubt that Saddam Hussein had means (including lucrative oil revenues) and motive to operate against America, which he blamed for destroying his dreams of a Greater Iraq; he had tried to assassinate former President G.H.W. Bush while in Kuwait, and there is evidence of some Iraqi operatives in the US around the time of 9/11 and its aftermath (regardless of any speculative alliance or ties to Al Qaeda). The Taliban and radical allies like Al Qaeda certainly were/are dangerous, but there was no comparable natural resource wealth in Afghanistan or expansionist agenda. This is not to say the alliance among radical Islamic factions was innocuous, as neighboring Indians can attest.
There are other relevant contrasts between the countries as well, in particular, their national geographies and their political histories. Iraq has a relatively flat terrain, ideally suitable for the kind of large-footprint military operations characteristic of the Gulf Wars. In addition, the country had been under a strong centralized dictatorship for decades under Saddam Hussein. On the other hand, more recent history of Afghanistian has been dominated by disputes among tribes or warlords and other religious and ideological differences, with considerable conservative Islamic resistance to modernization and secularization of society (e.g., by Ataturk and Communist reforms). Of particular note was the ultimately unsuccessful Soviet occupation over the decade ending with troop withdrawals in 1989. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan has mountain ranges which are particularly suitable for hit-and-run fundamentalist guerrilla operations.
There are widespread reports of corruption in the Afghan government, and there is serious doubt that the government leaders are making the tough power-sharing compromises necessary for national reconciliation. It is fundamentally unfair for the US military and the American people to sacrifice even more our finest sons and daughters continuing to enable a corrupt government, never mind supplying a disproportionate contribution of troops when in fact multiple NATO members have experienced the War on Terror.
There are obvious historical lessons from the failures in Vietnam and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, including the common distinctive characteristics of unpopular local governments and guerrilla-friendly terrains. The application of classic counter-insurgency strategies like those utilized by General Petraeus in Iraq is much more difficult in the context of Afghanistan.
It is time for Obama to stop trying to score political points on winning the "right" war. The War on Terror goes beyond just Al Qaeda. We cannot tie up our military indefinitely, disproportionately and exclusively in one country which is no longer a safe harbor for terrorists. This does not mean unilaterally surrendering Afghanistan to the inevitable reprise of a rogue government that promotes global instability. What it does mean is developing a smarter, more focused, realistic, flexible, and streamlined strategy of leveraging American manpower and treasure, not just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but around the world.
With an escalating federal deficit, we must remember that a more cost-effective, limited government also has implications for our military. We can no longer afford to underwrite the costs of being the world's policeman and need to delegate more responsibility to regional alliances. Finally, we need to recall the wisdom of our American forefathers, whom warned us against unnecessary foreign entanglements.
